The most common form of e-commerce systems allows businesses to sell goods and services to customers via the Internet. A human buyer still collects and interprets information on merchants and products, makes decisions about which merchants and products to investigate, and negotiates the terms of transactions with these merchants. Negotiation and bargaining can be described as a distributed search through a space of potential agreements. Participants raise or reduce their offers until an agreement is hopefully reached (Faratin, Sierra, & Jennings, 1998; Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2005; Jennings et al., 2001; Kraus, 1997; Nash, 1950; Weiss, 1999) . Bargaining, meanwhile, is a challenging area that has been well explored in both multi-agent systems (MAS) and economics. The result of bargaining is seriously related to the behaviors of
participants. Therefore, adding personality and behaviors to intelligent agents in a negotiation makes them more human-like and realistic.
In recent years, many researchers have fruitfully utilized the MASs to design and implement models for personality, behavior, and emotion among agents in several contexts (André, Rist, Mulken, & Klesen, 2000; Barber, Liu, & Ramaswamy, 1998; Bates, 1994; Ghasem-Aghaee & Ören, 2004; Gratch & Marsella, 2001 , 2004 Hudlicka, 2003 Hudlicka, , 2006 Martínez-Miranda & Aldea, 2005; Reilly & Bates, 1992; Sloman, 1993) . Behaviors are influenced by personalities so that personality refers to the sets of predictable behaviors by which people are recognized and identified (Ghasem-Aghaee & Ören, 2004) . Personality researchers have established the fivefactor model (FFM) of personality in 30 facets on Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Negative emotions (OCEAN model) . FFM is the most widely accepted set of descriptive personality traits and its capability in accounting for a wide variety of behaviors has been demonstrated (Barrett & Pietromonaco, 1997; Costa & McCrae, 1992a , 1992b , 1992c Heinström, 2003; Howard & Howard, 2004; Landers & Lounsbury, 2006; Liebert & Speigler, 1990; McAdams, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1985 , 1987 , 1999 Norman, 1963) .
To the best of our knowledge, the use of FFM in the context of electronic commerce, especially automated commercial negotiation and bargaining, is a research area still unexplored. Studies by Faratin et al. (1998) and Fatima et al. (2005) gracefully dealt with strategies in bilateral multi-issue negotiations. However, they considered boulware or conceder strategies not personality traits on their negotiation decision functions. The other work, closer to our study, in the concept of personality, is multiple-personality interaction, which has been used in a special COLORED TRAIL GAME (Talman, 2004) . In this work, agents are equipped with a negotiation module to negotiate with each other, either on resources they possess or skills they maintain so that their goals are met. For every opponent agent, the adaptive multipersonality agent chooses the most suitable personality to interact with the opponent agent from a variety of possible personalities. Hudlicka (2006) also describes a nice generic methodology and framework for representing the effects of multiple integrating emotional states and personality traits on political decision making. However, her study lacks a computational model.
In this article, we present a simulation of the FFM of personality to enhance the realism of rational bargaining behavior and show how measurable personality traits can be incorporated into multi-agent systems. We model human bargaining behavior by introducing a computational personality-based bargaining approach. We investigate the effect of different types of behaviors related to the personalities of participants in a multi-criteria bilateral bargaining in a single-good e-marketplace, where both parties are simulated with OCEAN agents based on the FFM of personality and our Semi-Dynamic Bargaining approach. The simulation results suggest and model compound personality style behaviors appropriate to gain the best overall utility in the role of buyer and seller and also with regard to social welfare and market activeness. This generic personality-based approach can be used as a predictive or descriptive model of human behavior to adopt in appropriate situations in many areas involving negotiation and bargaining (e.g., commerce, business, politics, military, etc.). However, this study also has limitations with respect to lack of empirical data as well as lack of psychological studies on personality behaviors in negotiation domains that had us using highly stereotypical personality types in our case study simulation. The article consists of five sections. We give an overview of the FFM of personality in the next section. We present Personality-Based Bargaining in the third section. The fourth section gives the simulated results for an e-marketplace. Finally, the last section presents some conclusions and identifies the future works.
The five-factor model of personality
Personality is a pattern of behavioral, temperamental, emotional, and mental traits that characterize a unique individual. The FFM is essentially a "psychology of the stranger," providing information about persons that one would need to know when one knows nothing else about them. The FFM, while not universally accepted (Block, 2001; Korothov & Hannah, 2004; Shedler & Westen, 2004) but currently the most widely accepted, is one set of descriptive personality traits (Allbeck & Badler, 2002; Borgotta, 1964; Fiske, 1949; Heinström, 2003; Liebert & Speigler, 1990; McAdams, 1992; McCrae & Costa, 1985 , 1987 Norman, 1963; Smith, 1967) . In contemporary psychology, personality is specified as a function of 30 attributeseach of which is called a personality facet. The personality facets are clustered in five groups-each called a personality trait (or personality factor). (Acton, 2001; Costa & McCrae, 1992c; Ghasem-Aghaee & Ören, 2004; Heinström, 2003; Howard & Howard, 2004; Ören & Ghasem-Aghaee, 2003) .
Personality traits O, C, E, A, and N are determined (symbolically or numerically) from the values of the personality facets. When the values are numerical, they can be normalized to have a value between 0 and 100. The closer to 100, the more positive the factor, and the closer to zero, the more negative the factor. In determination of a trait, all of its six facets may have equal contributions or some may have more influence. The second case can be treated by assigning each facet a different weight. The dominant facet determines the value of the trait. The values of the personality facets that are linguistic variables (Zadeh, 1965; Zadeh, Fu, Tanaka, & Shimura, 1975) can be specified at several levels, namely, low, medium, and high levels, and also very low, low, medium, high, and very high levels or seven levels of very very low, very low, low, medium, high, very high, and very very high, and so on (Ghasem-Aghaee & Ören, 2004; Howard & Howard, 2004; Ören & Ghasem-Aghaee, 2003) .
Depending on the three levels of Openness, for example, three types of personalities are identified: preserver, moderate, and explorer. Table 1 shows personality types constructed from different levels of personality traits. Once the values of the six facets of a personality trait are specified, the corresponding personality type can be determined and entered in the personality template (Ghasem-Aghaee & Ören, 2004; Howard & Howard, 2004; Ören & Ghasem-Aghaee, 2003) . Concerning the personality traits description and personality types together gives compound personalities in different problems. In a bargaining problem, each agent can behave in negotiator, submissive, avoider, or aggressor styles (Ören & Ghasem-Aghaee, 2003) . These styles have fuzzy values, which are determined through fuzzy inference engines based on the rules shown in Table 2 .
A personality-based simulation of bargaining in e-commerce
The area of bargaining (Nash, 1950) mechanisms has been well explored in both multi-agent systems and economics. In bargaining, participants raise or reduce their offers by making distributed searches through a space of potential agreements until an agreement is hopefully reached (Weiss, 1999) . However, the result of bargaining is seriously related to the behaviors of participants. The application of the FFM is likely to facilitate progress in the study of how personality influences the negotiation and bargaining process. In this section, to make intelligent agents more human-like and more realistic, we investigate the effect of personality of participants in a multicriteria bilateral bargaining in a single-good e-marketplace, where both parties are OCEAN agents based on the FFM of personality and our heuristic Semi-Dynamic Bargaining approach.
Semi-Dynamic Bargaining
Semi-Dynamic Bargaining is an extended model of our previous work, Simple Semi-Dynamic Cooperative Bargaining (Nassiri-Mofakham, Nematbakhsh, GhasemAghaee, & Baraani-Dastjerdi, 2006) . This extended paradigm is a bilateral multi-criteria bargaining that deals with bargaining by a single buyer and a single seller in a multi-criteria single-good e-marketplace, where participants do not necessarily behave cooperatively. Rational participants are seeking contracts that conclude the best utility in their own behavioral regions. We assume that both buyer and seller know the legal interval of each good criterion value announced from a legal party in the e-marketplace. A typical agent A, A ∈ {B, S}, has two sets containing n C criteria value intervals and their respective W 
Mapping the personality model in bargaining
The bargaining result depends on the behaviors participants exhibit while making offers and counter-offers based on their own utility functions affected by their personality traits. With respect to Table 2 , a seller who is greedy to attain the best utility on selling his or her good may resist an offer, hoping to find another buyer who is eager to purchase the good based on his or her offer, that is, he or she achieves in an avoider style. Conversely, a seller who is pessimistic and worried about losing the current buyer easily defers the offer and achieves in a submissive style. Between the two styles, a seller is responsive and sometimes tempted to change his or her offer. Therefore, he or she behaves as the negotiator. The lack of investigations on behaviors based on personality models in the negotiations domain had us deliberate to identify what facets depict negotiation behaviors. According to the personality traits mentioned in the second section of this article, not all of the facets affect the personality types among emotion-free agents in an e-marketplace. According to the facet descriptions in the second section, C3, C4, C6, E5, all facets of A, N1, N3, and N5 play the most important role in the decision-making process on how to reach an agreement. From Table 2 , it seems that C and E factors are related to risk taking or risk neutrality of a party, while A and N factors determine the degree of cooperation or resistance. Therefore, only C4 (achievement striving), C6 (deliberation), and E5 (excitement seeking) facets heavily determine the risk factor and ambition ratio to participating in bargaining. In addition, all facets of A (trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, tender mindedness) and N5 (impulsiveness) are facets related to degree of cooperation and resistance. Therefore, we define two factors of risk and cooperation (0 ≤ R A ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ CP A ≤ 1) through two fuzzy inference engines based on the rules presented in Table 3 . However, not all of the combinations of ternary qualitative values of designated trait may generate logical rules for risk and cooperation factors, indeed. We had to consider some of these rules intuitively to depict negotiation behaviors as a part of our approach. Certainly, through inference engines, the more numerous and accurate rules are exploited, the more robust results will be yielded. However, the manner of rules definition does not affect the generality of the whole approach but the results that model the behaviors.
By considering Tables 2 and 3 , we assign boundaries for four defined styles of avoider, submissive, negotiator, and aggressor. We also add semi-avoider, semi-submissive, and semi-aggressor styles. Similar to the truth table for binary variables, we can construct a value table for these two ternary value factors (see Table 4 ).
By simulation, we design different conditions to model scenarios of how each personality type may behave in a real-world situation. We then integrate them into a single Personality-Based Bargaining model (as shown in Figure 1 ). Each participant in negotiation has two sides: stationary and mobile. The stationary part is initialized by criteria values based on market rules. Next, risk and cooperation factors elicited from personality facets of the participant along with his or her threshold values and calculated preferences are entered into the Personality-Based Bargaining algorithm (for the mathematical detail of this algorithm, see Nassiri-Mofakham, GhasemAghaee, Nematbakhsh, & Baraani-Dastjerdi, 2007) . The algorithm consists of three parts. First, it assigns values to a few boundary parameters as well as the best corresponding initial offer. After that, a mobile agent is triggered at the mobile side. This mobile agent travels toward the other party. Both parties can make an initial offer. Without missing the generality, the rational buyer agent makes an initial offer using a search in his or her preferences. He or she seeks an alternative so that the utility corresponding to its criteria values is equal to or greater than his or her best utility value. Then, he or she itinerates toward seller agent to submit the offer. Seller receives and analyzes this offer. Then, they follow suitable actions using interchanging offers and counter-offers.
Most of the time, the seller simply accepts or rejects the offer. By exchanging an "accept" message, the negotiation ends successfully. In a "reject" case, the buyer agent proposes the next preference as a new offer. However, analogous to real behaviors in negotiations in real-world markets, we added a "do nothing" silence status in the algorithm. Some situations exist in which related utility is acceptable but the seller or buyer wants to continue negotiating, hoping to gain higher utility, and therefore, he or she does not show his or her acceptance and wants the counterpart to decrease his or her utility again to provide him or her with a better offer. In addition to silence situations, there is another situation, in which the participant does not show satisfaction. Due to different personalities of both buyer and seller, each of them may be eager to gain a better utility than the recent acceptable offer of the counterpart. Then, the seller or buyer may take a risk in bargaining a counter-offer, yielding a utility higher than the recent acceptable offer. On the other hand, sometimes they cooperatively accept an offer, which may not be the best possible one. However, not all negotiations reach successful results. Sometimes, a participant consumes all of his or her alternatives during the negotiation process and does not have any other choices to continue. Therefore, he or she sends his or her disagreement with continuing the negotiation process. This negotiation paradigm is cycle-free and deadlock-free, however, and finishes in a finite number of rounds, because, before proposing a counter-offer, the participant checks the alternative against previously met alternatives in rare previous bargaining rounds during this negotiation.
Nassiri-Mofakham et al. / PERSONALITY-BASED BARGAINING 7
L L avoider L M semi-avoider L H submissive M L semi-submissive M M negotiator M H semi-submissive H L semi-aggressor H M semi-
The personality-based bargaining model (m
• computeBoundaryValues.
• Buyer agent B can be initiator and offer an alternative yielding U B = bestInitialOffer. 
Simulation of the model
In this section, we investigate the results obtained via a multi-agent simulation system developed by Aglets (IBM Corporation, 2005) and Fuzzy Logic Toolbox for Use With MATLAB 7 (Gulley & Jang, 1995) using the Personality-Based Bargaining model (third section). Aglets are Java-based autonomous agents providing mobility capability to travel across a network and synchronous and asynchronous message passing to communicate with each other.
We designed different conditions to model scenarios of how each personality type (corresponding to artificial stereotype) may behave in a real-world situation. Simulations were run with the OCEAN buyer and seller agents in a single-good e-marketplace, where we assumed the good with three ShippingMethod, PaymentMethod, and PackageStyle criteria. The first criterion includes six methods coded from 1 through 6, namely, normal, registered, certified, express, DHL, and air express. The second criterion denotes the three cash, credit, and check payment methods coded from 1 to 3. Finally, the third criterion is related to the packaging methods of nylon, pocket, carton, and box styles, coded from 1 through 4.
Since the buyer and seller aspiration and reservation values with respect to a particular criterion may or may not be on opposite sides, they individually score the criteria values. They act through their fixed scoring methods. We suppose that all criteria being scored are within 0 to 100. Some criteria may be out of their scoring range. In this case, the buyer or seller scores the criterion with zero value.
The buyer scores shipping as 0, 90, 90, 100, 60, and 70 for normal, registered, certified, express, DHL, and air express methods, respectively. He or she similarly assigns the values of 60, 100, and 80 to cash, credit, and check payment methods, as well as 0, 70, 100, and 80 to nylon, pocket, carton, and box packaging styles, respectively.
On the other hand, the seller scores shipping as 100, 90, 80, 70, 70, and 60 for normal, registered, certified, express, DHL, and air express methods, respectively. He or she similarly assigns the values of 100, 80, and 50 to cash, credit, and check payment methods, as well as 90, 100, 80, and 80 to nylon, pocket, carton, and box packaging styles, respectively.
Moreover, the importance of the ShippingMethod, PaymentMethod, and PackagingStyle for buyer and seller is 0.3, 0.2, and 0.5, and 0.2, 0.5, and 0.3, respectively (see Tables 5, 6 , and 7).
According to Equation 1, each agent A, A ∈ {B, S}, computes the utility of all 72 (= 6 × 3 × 4) possible alternatives related to all permutations of six shipping methods, three payment methods, and four packaging styles through calculating the preferences utility matrix as follows. In addition, according to the Semi-Dynamic Bargaining section, random values between 0 and 100 are assigned to related facets of C, E, A, and N personality traits, that is, C4, C6, and E5 for determining the risk factor, and all facets of A and N5 for determining the cooperation factor with respect to Table 5 . Using three fuzzy inference engines for the agreeableness trait, risk factor, and cooperation factor, we generate different values for risk and cooperation factors, one per each level of low, medium, and high (see Tables 8-10 ). Inputs to and outputs of these three fuzzy inference engines all are normalized in the range of 0 through 100. We exploited the MATLAB Fuzzy Toolbox to define our fuzzy inference engines for fuzzification of facets and defuzzification of required factors. Finally, the outputs of risk and cooperation engines are normalized into the range of 0 through 1 and then fed into Aglets to embody personality for knowledgeable agents. The combination of these three different risk and cooperation factor values provides nine different behaviors. Therefore, each party can exploit agents with at least nine different personalities against the other party (see Table 11 ). Each personality type consists of two letters: The first one is the risk factor and the second one is the cooperation factor.
Simulation results and discussions
We investigate the results obtained via simulations, which were run with a buyer agent and a seller agent in a single-good e-marketplace with three ShippingMethod, PaymentMethod, and PackageStyle criteria. Utility values of all alternatives concerning buyer and seller are computed according to Equation 2 and sorted nested, first based on the utility value and then (in equal cases) based on the values of all criteria in descending order corresponding to their weights in Tables 5 through 7 . Then, to simulate different arbitrary personalities, different lower and upper pairs of threshold utility values are generated within the related meaningful utility value intervals along with the values determining the risk and cooperation factors for each buyer and seller agent according to Table 11. After that, the Personality-Based Bargaining model specifies boundary values and initial offer. Nine different personality types for buyer and seller interact with each other. We compute the number of withdrawals by buyer and seller, number of times that buyer and seller did nothing, number of bargainings made by buyer and seller, disagreement to continue from buyer and seller sides, number of rounds, contracted alternative (if any), resulted utility for buyer and seller, and finally, the social welfare (as the sum of the utilities of both party, in the case of a contract).
We assumed that the buyer agent makes an initial offer using a search in his or her preferences. He or she seeks an alternative so that the utility corresponding to its criteria values is equal to or greater than his or her best utility value. If the seller agent makes an initial offer, the following discussions are maintained by replacing buyer with seller and vice versa. By integrating the experimental results (NassiriMofakham et al., 2007) , worthwhile proofs of some real social and commercial evidences are realized. First of all, the results show that this model behaves like many 
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real games-asymmetric. This means that it depends on who starts the negotiation. We categorize results in five groups of utility and signed Euclidian distance (SED) of utility of contract from the utility of best initial offer of buyer/seller agent, social welfare, time, and e-marketplace activeness (L = low; M = medium; H = high): 1/2. Not all experiments result in contracts. A negative SED means a contract with acceptable but not the best utility, while a positive distance means a contract with the utility being better than the desired alternative. The LM seller gains the best SED (beyond his or her desires), while the worst SED is gained by MM. Nevertheless, this MM seller has gained the maximum utility but just with a few buyer agents. If the seller desires to gain the best SED, he or she must interact with the LH buyer. This buyer has a low risk factor but a high degree of cooperation. Moreover, the LH buyer agent provides the best SED for the buyer, as well. The worst SED for the buyer is attained by the MM buyer agent. 3. Whenever time is an important parameter for cutting the negotiation fast (with or without a contract), the best buyer agent is MH, while the worst one who consumes the largest number of rounds is HM. However, among all negotiations that resulted in contracts, the LL buyer agent consumed the least number of rounds. On the other hand, the LL seller agent has the least number of rounds in both negotiations with and without contracts. In fact, the MM seller agent consumes the largest number of rounds. 4. This MM seller agent has done the largest number of bargaining, all of which fortunately resulted in contracts. In addition, the MM buyer agent has done the largest number of bargaining, all of which fortunately resulted in contracts, as well. Moreover, the MM seller agent provides the best social welfare in interacting with almost all of the buyer agents. The best social welfare is also whenever the buyer is a ML agent. On the other hand, the LH buyer agent creates the worst social welfare. With the interaction of these pairs of buyer and seller agents, the social welfare is at maximum value: (HM,LM), (HH,LM), (LH,MM), (MM,MM), and (ML,MH). 5. Without any regard to gained utilities, whenever the activeness of the market is an important parameter, LL and LH seller agents are the best ones. These seller agents have done contracts with all types of buyers. In addition, a ML buyer agent has the most contracts in comparison with almost all of the sellers.
We summarize these results in Table 12 . Then, according to the truth table for ternary values of risk and cooperation (see section "Mapping the personality model in bargaining"), the buyer and seller must behave in the styles shown in Table 13 to satisfy individual or macro desires. As discussed in that section, a seller who is pessimistic and worried about losing the current buyer easily defers his or her offer and achieves in a submissive style, while an avoider seller who is greedy to attain the best utility on selling his or her good may resist an offer, hoping to find another buyer who is eager to purchase the good based on his or her offer. Between the two styles, a negotiator seller is responsive and sometimes tempted to change his or her offer. Furthermore, by adapting Table 12 with Tables 1 and 3, we deduce Table 14 . The descriptive behaviors in this table are based on the rules and justifications presented in the section "Mapping the personality model in bargaining."
Conclusion and future works
Via some experimental result sets on artificial stereotypes, we showed that whenever a party initiates negotiation, his or her counterpart will gain utilities beyond his or her desires. The results advise the buyer to devolve the chance of a first offer to sellers, hoping to gain utilities beyond his or her desire. The simulation results suggest and model compound personality style behaviors appropriate to gain the best overall utility in the role of buyer and seller and with regard to social welfare and market activeness. The buyer is better to behave with low risk and high cooperation, while the seller is better to behave with low risk and medium cooperation to gain better utilities. It is better that the buyer and seller do not bargain. However, whenever they do, they reach contracts. If they want to reach contracts in negotiations in the least number of rounds, both buyer and seller must behave with low risk and low cooperation. In the macro point of view, social welfare and market activeness are more important than individual participants' utilities. To provide the best social welfare, it is suggested that sellers and buyers be encouraged to behave both with medium risk but with medium and low cooperation, respectively. For market activeness, sellers with low risk and a low or high degree of cooperation and buyers with medium risk and low cooperation are the best ones. They make the greatest number of contracts in the market with almost all types of counterpart. A seller who is pessimistic and worried about losing the current buyer easily defers his or her offer and achieves in a submissive style, while an avoider seller who is greedy to attain the best utility on selling his or her good may resist an offer, hoping to find another buyer who is eager to purchase the good based on his or her offer. Between the two styles, a negotiator seller is responsive and sometimes tempted to change his or her offer.
This article advances the state of the art in that such an application of FFM to a commercial negotiation protocol has not been previously undertaken. The approach presented in this article is generic and can be adapted to any other descriptive personality model, so that needed facets or traits are filtered to compute appropriate risk and cooperation factors. By adapting this computational model with any other personality models, it will be possible to evaluate these models against each other. This generic personality-based approach can be used as a predictive or descriptive model of human behavior to adopt in appropriate situations in many domains involving negotiation and bargaining (e.g., commerce, business, politics, military, etc.) for conflict prevention and resolution in each of those competitive or cooperative negotiation domains providing validation against human data.
In this study, we exploited artificial stereotypical personalities. Although our concluding results are based on conflict styles introduced by Howard and Howard (2004) , however, a logical possibility of personality descriptions (resulting from the simulation) in n-dimensional facet space may be unlikely to co-occur within a given individual. By adapting this generic computational model with empirical data, it will be possible to evaluate validation of the model against human data. For example, an Artificial Neural Network model can validate the accuracy of the model by a postsession analysis for training sets. In addition, the rules we used in inferencing different bargaining behaviors were intuitively designed and adapted by authors to conflict styles introduced by Howard and Howard (2004) . An interesting study may be done by socio-econo-psychologists on compound bargaining styles by incorporating other styles of problem solving, decision making, and so on. More numerous and more accurate rules will yield more sound results. Moreover, in FFM, each fivefactor dimension is correlationally linked to other five-factor dimensions. If an extended model of a higher order factor analysis on FFM (Block, 2001) can be developed in a descriptive form, it can be adopted to this approach. In addition, in the approach to the personality-based bargaining mechanism presented in this article, we have not considered learning features. Elegant machine learning techniques can be applied in learning during bargaining.
